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Abstract
Background: This study examines health-related “hardship financing” in order to get better insights on how poor
households finance their out-of-pocket healthcare costs. We define hardship financing as having to borrow money
with interest or to sell assets to pay out-of-pocket healthcare costs.
Methods: Using survey data of 5,383 low-income households in Orissa, one of the poorest states of India, we
investigate factors influencing the risk of hardship financing with the use of a logistic regression.
Results: Overall, about 25% of the households (that had any healthcare cost) reported hardship financing during the
year preceding the survey. Among households that experienced a hospitalization, this percentage was nearly 40%, but
even among households with outpatient or maternity-related care around 25% experienced hardship financing.
Hardship financing is explained not merely by the wealth of the household (measured by assets) or how much is
spent out-of-pocket on healthcare costs, but also by when the payment occurs, its frequency and its duration (e.g.
more severe in cases of chronic illnesses). The location where a household resides remains a major predictor of the
likelihood to have hardship financing despite all other household features included in the model.
Conclusions: Rural poor households are subjected to considerable and protracted financial hardship due to the
indirect and longer-term deleterious effects of how they cope with out-of-pocket healthcare costs. The social
network that households can access influences exposure to hardship financing. Our findings point to the need to
develop a policy solution that would limit that exposure both in quantum and in time. We therefore conclude that
policy interventions aiming to ensure health-related financial protection would have to demonstrate that they have
reduced the frequency and the volume of hardship financing.
1. Background
While we know that the biggest part of health expendi-
tures in India is paid by health-seekers themselves when
getting care, we know much less about how those costs
are met. Evidence confirms that out-of-pocket spending
on healthcare absorb more than one quarter of house-
hold resources net of food costs in at least one-tenth of
all households in India [1]. All over India, the level of
out-of-pocket spending is 69.5% of total health expendi-
tures [2]. This considerable burden warrants a better
understanding of how poor households finance these
out-of-pocket healthcare costs. This article focuses on
this very question, using data from Orissa, where out-
of-pocket spending represents nearly 80% of health
expenditure [2].
The literature dealing with financing of out-of-pocket
healthcare cost includes definitions of “catastrophic”
healthcare expenditures when spending exceeds an
essentially arbitrary threshold. Xu et al. [3] fix the thresh-
old at 40% of disposable income net of subsistence needs;
Russell [4] and Van Doorslaer et al. [1] use a threshold of
10% of total annual household income. However, these
methods fail to recognize that a uniform threshold might
represent varying levels of hardship. For example, spend-
ing 10% by a poor household could mean withdrawing a
child from school or skipping a meal, while the same
spending level would not entail any immediate conse-
quence for a richer household[ 5 , 6 ] .A l s ot h et i m i n go f
the payment could cause different cash-flow problems.
As most rural poor households in India have irregular
flows of income, they would find it easier to pay during
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crop or from work as agricultural labourers) than in
other times of the year. Morduch and Rutherford [7]
reported this cash-flow pattern to hold true in most low-
income countries.
We therefore assess the hardship a household faces as
a consequence of health expenses not merely by the
amount spent, but by the additional costs to the direct
cost of healthcare related to how the out-of-pocket
spending is financed. This is in line with notions put
forward by Flores et al. [8] and Kruk et al. [5].
Three sources of financing out-of-pocket healthcare
costs can be distinguished: paying from current income or
savings; borrowing with zero interest (e.g. from family and
friends), and borrowing with interest or selling assets. The
first two categories may be regarded as less burdensome
than the third [5,9,10], because selling assets or borrowing
money with interest usually entails a cost. This cost is self-
explanatory in the case of interest on loans [11]. Selling
assets also generates costs, such as losses when assets are
sold at less than optimal price, or future income loss due
to the sale of income-generating assets (like land or live-
stock). Thus, we say that households incur “hardship
financing” when they are exposed to a less stable or wor-
sened financial state brought about by additional costs/
losses due to borrowing or selling assets. This definition
follows Kruk et al. [5], with the notable modification that
we only consider borrowing with interest instead of any
borrowing. Our adjustment is in agreement with previous
findings [12] and with our investigations that confirmed
that borrowing from family/friends for healthcare pur-
poses is indeed mostly interest-free.
Many of the previous publications regarding the finan-
cing sources for out-of-pocket payments for healthcare in
developing countries, and in India, are related to financing
of care for specific diseases [4,13-19] and mostly based on
small-scale surveys. Some studies look at specific popula-
tion segments [9,20], others used data available on a whole
country level [5,8,10,21]. Kruk et al. [5], whom we follow in
the definition of “hardship financing”, looked at nationally
representative household surveys of 40 low- and middle-
income countries, whereas we look at rural (and largely tri-
bal) poor in three districts of Orissa, one of the poorest
states in India. By focusing on this target population, we
examine hardship financing of out-of-pocket payments for
healthcare expenditures among the most vulnerable seg-
ment of society in India. Our goal is to identify the para-
meters affecting households’ risk to resort to hardship
financing.
2. Methods
2.1. Setting and Sampling
We used data from a household survey undertaken early
in 2009 in the rural areas of Kalahandi, Khorda, and
Malkangiri districts of the state of Orissa. Orissa, the
eleventh largest state of India by population (41,947,358)
with 83% of population being rural [22,23], is located on
the Bay of Bengal at the east coast of India. The average
monthly per capita consumer expenditure (MPCE) of
INR459 (PPP$30.6) for rural Orissa, is the lowest of all
states [24]. The household survey questionnaire was
translated into Oriya (the local language), back trans-
lated for verification, and pre-tested among 80 house-
holds in the area. Surveyors who spoke local dialects
fluently conducted the survey.
We followed a three-stage sampling procedure. (i) The
sites in Orissa were selected due to a relationship with 11
NGOs
1 that invited the research team to conduct a base-
line study (prior to launching a development project
among their members). (ii) Within each district, villages
were selected randomly from among those selected by
the NGOs for the development project (27 villages in
Kalahandi, 22 in Khorda, 31 in Malkangiri). (iii) Stage
three entailed random sampling of two equal sub-cohorts
in each village: ‘member households’ and ‘non-member
households’ (comparator group). Member households
( i . e .h o u s e h o l d st h a ti n c l u d e da tl e a s to n ep e r s o nw h o
was a member of a Self-Help Group (SHG
2) linked to
one of the respective NGOs) were selected randomly out
of the membership list. Non-member households were
sampled randomly with the use of line sampling (from
the centre of the village 4 lines were drawn in the four
winds directions, “the four winds technique”)[ 2 5 ] .W e
interviewed a total of 5,383 households representing
25,606 individuals (with a similar number of member and
non-member households in every village, totalling 2,688
member and 2,695 non-member households and with a
similar number of households from each district, totalling
1820 households from Kalahandi, 1763 households from
Khorda and 1800 households from Malkangiri). 100% of
the sample interviewed was rural.
A tt h et i m eo ft h er o l l o u to ft h es u r v e yt h e r ew a sn o
local ethics committee in place in Orissa, India. We
however held a two-day workshop in preparation of the
study in which we discussed the ethical aspects of the
study with scholars and senior scholars from India.
Informed consent of the respondents was obtained at
the beginning of the interviews and we kept participants’
names confidential in data recording and analysis.
2.2. Data
The household survey questionnaire included questions
on socioeconomic status: education of household head,
occupation of household head, source of drinking water,
toilet facility and caste. Under the Constitution of India,
the government has “scheduled” certain backward
Indian classes or groups [hence Scheduled Castes [26]
or Scheduled Tribes [27], and “Other backward castes”],
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Tribes (Tribals or Adivasis) are mostly not Hindu and
thus out of the caste system and are considered the
most disadvantaged economically. Scheduled Castes
(Dalits and those sometimes labelled “Untouchable”)a r e
considered at the bottom of caste hierarchy. The list of
Other Backward Castes is quite dynamic and changes
from time to time in many states. All other castes are
described here as General Caste.
For household income, we followed the method
adopted by the Indian National Sample Survey Organi-
zation to obtain a proxy (monthly per capita consumer
expenditure) through questions on many items of
household expenditure (expenditures on food, clothing,
fuel, etc.) [24]. In our study, unlike the National Sample
Survey Organization, we did not include health expendi-
ture, because we seek to identify patterns of financing of
healthcare [6,8]. We label this proxy for socioeconomic
status as “income-proxy”.
We also developed an asset-index as proxy for socioe-
conomic status by performing a principal component
analysis (PCA) on various aspects of household assets,
following the guidelines of Vyas and Kumaranayake [28].
PCA is a statistical technique used for data reduction.
We included the following variables: house type, source
of lighting, way of cooking, land ownership, various con-
sumer durables (radio, motor cycle, telephone, etc.), pos-
session of animals (cattle, sheep, chickens, etc.). Size of
land and possession of animals were included as continu-
ous variables, the other variables as binary (yes/no) vari-
ables. We then used the factor scores of each of the
variables from the first principal component as weights
and computed a total for each household: the house-
hold’s socioeconomic score. Characteristic of this score is
that it has a mean equal to zero and a standard deviation
equal to one; the higher the score, the higher the implied
socioeconomic status or wealth of that household. As we
deal in this paper with health-related issues, source of
drinking water and toilet facility were not included in the
PCA given their possible direct relation with health status
[28,29].
Besides indicators of socioeconomic status, the house-
hold survey questionnaire included questions on health-
care utilization and cost. The households were asked
whether they had incurred expenditures for outpatient
care, hospital admittances and maternity-related care in
the year preceding the survey. Hospital admittances
reflected cases with inpatient stay exceeding 24 hours.
Stays in hospital of less than 24 hours were counted
under outpatient care, together with consultations with a
healthcare practitioner, and payment for medicines or
tests in an outpatient setting. Maternity-related utiliza-
tion included delivery and pre- and post-natal care.
Respondents were asked to estimate total direct medical
expenditures of the household in the year preceding the
survey, as well as the expenditures for hospital admit-
tances in the household in the year preceding the survey.
More detailed information on outpatient care utilization
and cost was queried for one month preceding the sur-
vey. Chronic illness in the household was identified by a
set of questions related to symptoms, length of illness
and regular medicine use.
We asked households also what hospital they would go
to in case of a hospitalization of more than 24 hours,
what kind of hospital this is, and the distance (travel time
in minutes) to this hospital. Similar questions were asked
related to the practitioner for outpatient care.
Households that reported healthcare costs for hospita-
lizations, outpatient care, or maternity-related care dur-
ing the year preceding the survey were asked how they
financed each type of these cost. Sources of financing
included using current income, money received as gift,
savings, money obtained from selling assets, money
obtained through borrowing (borrowing options included
relatives, friends/neighbours, bank, moneylender, or
microfinance e.g. local microfinance institution or SHG),
health insurance, and other sources. Households could
report as many sources of financing as relevant. With
respect to borrowing we also queried how much was bor-
rowed from each of these sources to pay for healthcare
costs. In this paper we ignore three sources since they
turned out to be negligible (e.g. 1.4% of households with
any health expenditure reported gifts, 0.02% reported
health insurance and 0.7% reported “other”).
We categorized a combination of financing sources
as hardship financing: selling assets or borrowing
money with interest from bank, microfinance or
moneylender. If a household had reported using at
least one of these financing sources, this household
was categorized as having had hardship financing.
Households that reported using only current income
and/or savings and/or borrowing from relatives or
friends/neighbours were defined as having had no
hardship financing.
2.3. Analysis
We investigated factors influencing the risk of house-
holds to need hardship financing when paying for
healthcare costs with the use of a multivariate analysis.
We applied a logistic regression (logit model) as the
outcome variable is a binary variable (yes/no hardship
financing). Only households that had healthcare costs in
the year preceding the survey were included in the
regression. The explanatory variables were included in
the model in a stepwise inclusion procedure
Data is analyzed using STATA version 11. The unit of
analysis is the household, reflecting the fact that in rural
low-income countries, many decisions on paying for
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duals [30].
Statistical significance of difference has been shown at
levels of 10%, 5% and 0.1% throughout the paper. When
ANOVA is used we show significance with *, ** and ***
respectively; when Pearson Chi-square is used we show
significance with
†,
†† and
††† respectively. In case of the
logistic regression statistical significance of the coefficient
(Z-test) is shown at levels of 5%, 1% and 0.1% with *, **
and *** respectively.
All amounts, reported in Indian Rupee (INR) during
the survey, were converted into international dollars
(Purchasing Power Parity, PPP$) using the exchange
rate of PPP$1 = INR 16.389 for 2009 [31].
3. Results
3.1. Socioeconomic profile
The socioeconomic profile of the sampled population is
summarized in Table 1. The majority of the studied
population is from Scheduled Caste or Tribe. The
m a j o r i t yo ft h eh o u s e h o l dh e a d sh a v en oo rv e r yl i t t l e
education and work as daily wage labourers or are self-
employed in agriculture. The income of our sampled
population in Orissa was on average below the extreme
poverty anchor of PPP$1.08 per person and day (defined
by the World Bank in 1993, equalling PPP$1.71 p.p.p.d.
when adjusted to the survey year 2009 and to India)
[32,33]. Most households have no toilet and get drinking
water from a shared tap in the village or hand pump/
well. The households consist on average of 4.8 persons
of which 8% are infants (0-4 years old) and 8% are
elderly (60 years and older).
The socioeconomic status indicators from the
National Sample Survey Organization for rural Orissa
show similar patterns as our aggregated total population
(table 1): income-proxy PPP$ 28.9 p.p.p.m., household
size 4.6 persons) [24].
3.2. Morbidity, healthcare availability, utilization and cost
Information on morbidity, availability of healthcare, uti-
lization of healthcare and healthcare expenditures of the
sampled population are summarized in Table 2.
Around 85% of the sampled households had health
expenditures in the year preceding the survey, and
almost 24% of households had to meet hospitalization
costs in the same period. Around 10% of the sampled
households have a chronically ill person in the
household.
Average health expenditures represented about 9% of
the average income-proxy for the sampled population
(income-proxy p.p.p.m. and household size table 1 total
health expenditure for the household last year table 2).
Households usually go to a public facility for hospitali-
zations of more than 24 hours. In about half of the cases
they go to a public facility for outpatient care. To go to
the facility where they would go to for a hospitalization
takes a little bit more than 50 minutes travel time; the
facility for outpatient care is on average 30 minutes
away from their homes.
In Additional Files 1 and 2 the same information of
Table 1 and 2 is shown separate for the member and non-
member sub-cohorts (defined in the methods section).
The difference between SHG members and non-members
Table 1 Demographics & socioeconomic status
Mean (± SE)
a
Income-proxy p.p.p.m (PPP$)
b 32.41 (± 0.29)*****
Asset-index
c 0.00 (± 0.03)*****
Household size 4.76 (± 0.02)*****
Ratio infants (0-4) in household 0.082 (± 0.002)****
Ratio elderly (60 and older) in household 0.075 (± 0.002)****
% of total
Caste
d
Scheduled Tribe 30.0
Scheduled Caste 22.3
Other Backward Caste 31.3
General Caste 16.5
Education level household head
No education 51.4
Class 1-5 22.2
Class 6-10 23.8
Class 11 and higher 2.7
Occupation household head
Self-employed agriculture 38.7
Self-employed business/trade 16.1
Regular Salaried employee 4.6
Daily wage labourer 30.8
Not working 9.9
Source of drinking water
Own tap 9.9
Shared tap 53.9
Hand-pump/well 36.2
Toilet facility
Own flush toilet 4.4
Own pit toilet 4.9
Shared toilet 1.0
No toilet 89.7
a SE = Standard Error.
b Income is proxied as monthly per capita consumer expenditure through
questions on many items of household expenditure and expressed in
Purchasing Power Parity International Dollar.
c Asset-index is a proxy for socioeconomic status based on various aspects of
household assets. The index is calculated using a principal component
analysis (PCA).
d Caste is a proxy for socioeconomic status in India. Scheduled Castes (Dalits
and those sometimes labelled “untouchable”) are considered at the bottom of
caste hierarchy. The list of Other Backward Castes is quite dynamic and
changes from time to time in many states. All other castes are described here
as General Caste.
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cant for most indicators. The difference in socioeconomic
profile between the member and non-member cohorts
seems to be significant, pointing to a higher socioeco-
nomic status for SHG members. However, for the indica-
tors that are significantly different, this difference is rather
small and probably immaterial. Therefore we aggregated
the two sub-cohorts for the descriptive statistics, but
included the membership variable in the regression
analysis.
3.3. Healthcare financing
We asked respondents how they financed their health-
care costs (Figure 1). The majority of the households
reported to have used at least (some) of their current
income and savings to pay for their health expenditures.
However, the multiplicity of sources shows that house-
holds were often unable to fund all their health expendi-
tures from their current income and savings alone.
Households selling assets or borrowing money with
interest in order to finance their healthcare were defined
as households with hardship financing. Households that
were able to finance their healthcare costs solely from
current income, savings and/or borrowing without inter-
est (from relatives or friends/neighbours) are defined as
households with no hardship financing. Figure 2 shows
the shares of households paying healthcare costs with
hardship financing versus households that did not have
to use hardship financing.
Overall, about 25% of the households (with any
healthcare cost) had hardship financing during the year
preceding the survey. Among households that experi-
enced a hospitalization this percentage is much higher,
nearly 40% had hardship financing. Quite unexpectedly,
23% of household that incurred outpatient costs also
reported that they had to use hardship financing sources
to pay for this outpatient care, as well as 25% of the
households that had a materni t yc a s ei nt h er e f e r e n c e
period.
3.4. Parameters influencing the risk of hardship financing
We explored with the use of a logistic regression the
factors that could influence the risk of households to
need hardship financing when paying for healthcare
costs (Table 3).
Socioeconomic and demographic parameters
We found that, whereas the logarithm of the income-
proxy was not a significant predictor of hardship financing,
the asset-index was a highly significant and negative pre-
dictor (i.e. households with a lower asset-index have a
higher propensity to have hardship financing). The educa-
tion of the household head did not influence the probabil-
ity to have hardship financing while his occupation did;
households where the household head is self-employed in
Table 2 Morbidity, healthcare availability, utilization and cost in the sampled population
Mean (± SE)
a
Total health expenditure last year for household (PPP$)
b 167.34 (± 5.14)
Distance to preferred hospital (in minutes) 52.48 (± 0.54)
Distance to preferred primary care practitioner (in minutes) 30.40 (± 0.40)
% of total
Household with chronic ill person 10.5
Household with hospitalization costs last year 23.5
Household with outpatient care costs last year 83.8
Household with maternity costs last year 14.4
Household with any healthcare costs last year 85.1
Hospital household usually goes to
Private 6.3
Public 93.7
Preferred primary care practitioner household usually goes to
Traditional healer 36.6
Government facility 50.4
Unqualified private doctor (non-MBBS)
c 7.6
AYUSH practitioner
d 3.2
Qualified private doctor/specialist (MBBS) 2.2
a SE = Standard Error.
b Total health expenditure last year for household expressed in Purchasing Power Parity International Dollar.
c Unqualified private doctor (non-MBBS) is a doctor practicing allopathic medicine without having a medical degree (Medical Bachelor and Bachelor of Surgery).
d AYUSH is the aggregate of all qualified systems of traditional medicines in India: Ayurveda, Yoga and Naturopathy, Unani, Siddha and Homeopathy.
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labourer, or does not work due to any reason all have a
significant higher likelihood to have hardship financing
than households where the household head is a regular
salaried employee. Caste, household size, the ratio of
infants or the ratio of elderly in the household did not
have a significant impact on hardship financing.
T h em i n o r i t y( 1 0 % )o fh o u s e h o l d sw i t hab e t t e rs o u r c eo f
water are less likely to have hardship financing. The type of
toilet used was not a significant explanatory variable.
Morbidity parameters & health expenditures
The logarithm of the total health expenditures during the
year preceding the survey is a significant and positive
predictor of hardship financing. Interestingly, having a
chronically ill person in the household, or having experi-
enced one or more events of hospitalization in the year
preceding the survey are both significant independent
predictors even after the overall health expenditures has
been taken into account in the regression analysis.
3.5. Impact of SHG membership on hardship financing
The logistic regression (table 3) revealed that house-
holds where someone is a member of an SHG have a
higher propensity to have hardship financing. This we
found somewhat unexpected as we did not observe a
big difference between the member and non-member
sub-cohorts in demographics, socioeconomic status,
morbidity, healthcare utilization and costs. Also the
direction of the influence is somewhat unexpected.
When looking at the demographics, SHG member
households have a slightly higher asset-index, have more
household heads that are salaried employees and more
often have their own tap than non-member households
(i.e. less poor households). And, from the logistic regres-
sion (table 3) it can be seen that, as expected, less poor
households are less likely to have hardship financing.
But, when controlled for these variables in the regres-
sion itself, it seems that SHG members are more likely
to have hardship financing.
When looking at the financing sources used by members
and non-members, we found that SHG members rely sig-
nificantly more often on microfinance as a source of bor-
rowing than non-members when paying for all health
expenditures, hospital expenditures, or outpatient expen-
ditures (4.4% vs. 2.3%, p < .001; 8.5% vs. 4.7%, p < 0.01;
3.7% vs. 2.1%, p < .01 respectively, Chi2). Non-members
Figure 1 Healthcare financing.
Figure 2 Hardship financing.
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Page 6 of 13Table 3 Factors that influence the risk of hardship financing for households with healthcare costs (logistic regression)
Coefficient 95% Confidence interval
Socioeconomic and demographic parameters
Log income-proxy
a 0.1197 -0.0694 0.3089
Asset-index
b -0.1176*** -0.1698 -0.0655
Employment household head
Salaried employee Reference
Self-employed in agriculture 0.8420** 0.3307 1.3533
Self-employed in business/trade 0.7521** 0.2176 1.2866
Daily wage labourer 0.9204** 0.4005 1.4404
Not working 0.7824** 0.2145 1.3503
Education household head
No education Reference
Class 1-5 -0.0831 -0.2991 0.1329
Class 6-10 -0.1719 -0.3930 0.0492
Class 11 and higher -0.0340 -0.6023 0.5343
Caste
c
Scheduled Caste -0.1293 -0.4347 0.1761
Scheduled Tribe 0.2173 -0.0632 0.4978
Other Backward Caste -0.1570 -0.4255 0.1116
General Caste Reference
Household size 0.0370*** -0.0135 0.0876
Ratio infants (0-4) in household 0.2015 -0.4490 0.8520
Ratio elderly (60+) in household 0.1851 -0.3583 0.7284
Source of water
Own tap Reference
Shared tap 0.4873** 0.1733 0.8013
Hand pump/Well 0.3540* 0.0286 0.6794
Type of toilet
Own flush toilet Reference
Own pit toilet 0.0556 -0.5192 0.6305
Shared toilet 0.7037 -0.2623 1.6697
No toilet -0.0607 -0.4942 0.3728
Morbidity parameters and health expenditures
Log health expenditures last year 0.7232*** 0.6365 0.8099
Chronic illness in household
No chronic ill Reference
Chronic ill 0.3779** 0.1301 0.6257
Hospitalization in household last year
No hospitalization Reference
Hospitalization 0.7225*** 0.5335 0.9116
SHG membership in household
No SHG member Reference
SHG member
d 0.2184** 0.0536 0.3833
Location of residence
Khorda district Reference
Kalahandi district 1.3776*** 1.1376 1.6176
Malkangiri district 0.1739 -0.0947 0.4424
Constant -9.5496*** -11.1226 -7.9766
N 4121
Likelihood ratio test:
LR chi2(27) 1025.76
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ings in order to pay for hospital expenditures than mem-
bers (23.8% vs. 17.0%, p < .01, Chi2).
3.6. Impact of location on hardship financing
When controlled for all features of individual households
as variables included in the logistic regression, still the dis-
trict in which a household resides remains a major predic-
tor of the likelihood to have hardship financing (table 3).
Therefore we explored this further. Figure 3 shows the dif-
ference in hardship financing between the districts.
By using a step-by-step inclusion procedure for the
different variables in the regression, we found that the
healthcare costs explained the difference in hardship
financing between households in Malkangiri and Khorda
districts. No other variable had this effect. The differ-
ence between Kalahandi on the one hand and Khorda
and Malkangiri on the other hand remained unexplained
with the current set of variables.
In the course of the examination we also checked
other variables (e.g. preferred type of hospital, preferred
practitioner for outpatient care, and distance (in minutes
of travel time) to both preferred hospital and preferred
outpatient practitioner) which were eliminated from the
model as they did not proof to be statistically significant
and weakened the overall model.
In order to find an explanation for the difference
across the districts, we looked at alternative morbidity-
related parameters. From our household survey we also
have information on illness episodes and related costs
for last month that cannot be annualized at the level of
the single household. Therefore these parameters can
serve to estimate morbidity of the district, but cannot be
included in the regression analysis (Table 4).
In both Kalahandi and Khorda around 62% of the
households reported an illness last month and around
60% had outpatient treatment (in the form of consulta-
tion, medicines and/or tests) for that illness. In Malkan-
giri this percentage is lower: 51% of the households
reported an illness last month and 49% had some form
of outpatient treatment for that illness. The average cost
of the outpatient treatment is the highest in Khorda
(PPP$71.74), a bit lower in Kalahandi (PPP$56.65) and
much lower in Malkangiri (PPP$34.78).
Table 3 Factors that influence the risk of hardship financing for households with healthcare costs (logistic regression)
(Continued)
Prob > chi2 0.00
Pearson goodness-of-fit test:
Pearson chi2(4091) 3930.87
Prob > chi2 0.96
*** Significance of coefficient p < 0.05 (Z-test)
*** Significance of coefficient p < 0.01 (Z-test)
*** Significance of coefficient p < 0.001 (Z-test)
a Income is proxied as monthly per capita consumer expenditure through questions on many items of household expenditure and expressed in Purchasing
Power Parity International Dollar.
b Asset-index is a proxy for socioeconomic status based on various aspects of household assets. The index is calculated using a principal component analysis
(PCA).
c Caste is a proxy for socioeconomic status in India. Scheduled Castes (Dalits and those sometimes labelled “untouchable”) are considered at the bottom of caste
hierarchy. The list of Other Backward Castes is quite dynamic and changes from time to time in many states. All other castes are described here as General
Caste.
d A household was defined as SHG member if at least one person in the household was a member of a Self-Help Group (SHG) linked to one of the related NGOs.
Figure 3 Hardship financing in the three districts.
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of individual households were included in the regres-
sion, we wondered whether the average socioeconomic
status of the district is associated with the risk of hard-
ship financing. Therefore we also show the average
socioeconomic status (income-proxy and asset-index)
for each of the three districts in table 4. We found that
the sampled population in Khorda is on average weal-
thier than the other two districts which are similar to
each other.
Finally we examined whether the access of households
to a social network of family and/or friends that can
provide interest-free loans is different in the three dis-
tricts. We checked this through the share of households
with health expenditures that borrowed from family
and/or friends (table 4). We found that households in
Khorda had a better access to such a social network
than households in Kalahandi and Malkangiri. It is
interesting to note that a higher average asset-index is
positively associated with higher interest-free borrowing
from family/friends.
4. Discussion
In this study we found that many households experienced
hardship financing. We defined hardship financing as
being exposed to a less stable or worsened financial state
brought about by additional costs/losses due to borrowing
or selling assets. Based on the information in our house-
hold survey we cannot quantify losses due to selling assets.
However, using the amounts borrowed from different
sources as reported in our household survey and assuming
a standard period of 12 months for all loans, an equal
monthly repayment regime, and the following interest rates
per annum (48% - moneylenders, 24% - microfinance,
12.5% - banks [12,34]), we can estimate the additional cost
of the interest payment on the loans. Households that bor-
rowed with interest from a bank, moneylender or microfi-
nance paid, under the above assumptions, a mean interest
amount of PPP$64. This adds almost 24% to their health-
care costs, and represents on average nearly 5% of overall
annual household expenditure excluding health expendi-
ture. Unlike common economic theory that borrowing or
selling assets would have immediate welfare in the sense
that the ill person could be treated, that welfare gain
comes at a cost of welfare loss that extends over a much
longer period of time. The added welfare comes at varying
prices, which reflects not the value of the additional con-
sumption (in this case the cost of care) but the varying cost
of financing, which is more expensive for those that resort
to moneylenders than those that can resort to cheaper
sources of borrowing or do not have to borrow at all.
Hardship financing occursn o to n l yw h e nf a c i n gt h e
high cost of inpatient care (nearly 40%) but also outpati-
ent care (23%). This finding is in line with a previous
study where it was found that the aggregated costs of
outpatient care can exceed those of inpatient care among
low-income households in India [35]. Interestingly our
results reveal that maternity-related expenditures also
cause hardship financing for a quarter of the households,
although these events are known in advance and theoreti-
cally the household could save money and prepare for
them. When considering the entire target population, the
impact of hardship financing of outpatient care can be
considered more severe than of inpatient care since 84%
of the sampled households reported expenses due to out-
patient care and only 24% had expenses due to inpatient
care. Berman et al. [36] have reached a similar conclusion
using a different methodology. These authors compared
Table 4 Additional explanatory variables across the three districts.
Parameter Kalahandi Khorda Malkangiri
% of sampled household that reported illness last month 62.3% 61.6% 51.3%
††† d
% of sampled household that had outpatient treatment last month 60.7% 59.8% 49.1%
††† d
Outpatient cost of household that reported illness last month (± SE) (PPP$)
a 56.65 (± 2.21) 71.74 (± 3.39) 34.78 (± 1.77) ***
e
Income-proxy p.p.p.m. (± SE) (PPP$)
b 29.94 (± 0.48) 36.16 (± 0.54) 31.35 (± 0.46) ***
b)
Asset-index (± SE)
c -0.70 (± 0.04) 1.36 (± 0.06) -0.62 (± 0.05) ***
f
% of household with healthcare expenditures that reported borrowing from relatives
and/or friends
15.6% 23.7% 14.2%
††† g
*** Significance of overall difference across the three districts p< 0.001 (ANOVA)
††† Significance of overall difference across the three districts p< 0.001 (Pearson Chi-square)
a Average outpatient costs ± Standard Error, expressed in Purchasing Power Parity International Dollar.
b Income is proxied as monthly per capita consumer expenditure through questions on many items of household expenditure and expressed in Purchasing
Power Parity International Dollar.
c Asset-index is a proxy for socioeconomic status based on various aspects of household assets. The index is calculated using a principal component analysis
(PCA). SE = Standard Error
d The difference between Kalahandi and Khorda is not significant for both indicators, p = .687 and p = .593 respectively Chi2
e For each of the three districts the average cost is significantly different from any other district, p < .001 ANOVA
f The difference in average asset-index between Kalahandi and Malkangiri is not significant (p = .163 ANOVA)
g The difference in share between Kalahandi and Malkangiri is not significant, p = .282 Chi2
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Page 9 of 13the number of households below poverty line before and
after healthcare payment as a definition of impoverish-
ment and found that outpatient care was more impover-
ishing than inpatient care for households in India.
Peters [37] reported that 40% of hospitalized patients
(all-India average) had to sell assets or borrow money to
pay for hospital costs. Duggal [38] found that among the
poorest quintile in India, this percentage was 50%. One
would expect our result for the rural poor communities of
Orissa to be similar to the percentage found for the lowest
quintile. The discrepancy however could be due to the dif-
ference in definition, as we considered as hardship finan-
cing only borrowing with interest. According to these and
other results [5] it is reasonable to assume that poorer
households have a higher riskt oe x p e r i e n c eh a r d s h i p
financing. We wondered whether this difference still holds
within our study-population, all of which is poor. We
addressed this issue in our multivariate logistic regression
by including two measures for wealth (income-proxy and
asset-index). Interestingly we found that whereas a lower
asset-index was associated with a higher risk of hardship
financing, the association with income-proxy was not sig-
nificant. This may well reflect the situation that in the
informal economy many transactions are not monetized
and the possession of assets is a more reliable indicator of
socioeconomic status [39]. The negative association
between asset-index and hardship financing could be due
to asset-rich households for instance having a better
chance of accessing social networks that would be more
likely to give interest-free loans (non-hardship financing).
It cannot be excluded though that the lower asset-index
may be a result of, rather than the cause for, hardship
financing, as we measure the asset-index after the health
event.
Households where the household head is a salaried
employee were least likely to need hardship financing
compared to households where the head was self-
employed in business or in agriculture, was a daily-wage
labourer or did not work. As income was included in the
regression as a separate parameter, the reason for the cor-
relation with employment cannot be attributed solely to a
difference in income. Perhaps the difference is due to hav-
ing a steady rather than erratic flow of income. This find-
ing would then be in agreement with our hypothesis that
hardship financing can sometimes be caused by a time-
gap between the inflow of income and outflow of health
expenses.
From our logistic regression it turned out, as could be
intuitively expected, that health expenditures in the last
year were significantly associated with the risk for hard-
ship financing. However, interestingly, having had a
chronic illness or hospitalization in the household in the
last year were also independent significant indicators for
hardship financing. This means that the presence of
chronic illness or hospitalization affected the risk of
hardship financing in a way which was independent of
the related expenses. Both chronic illness and hospitaliza-
tion generate many indirect costs (loss of income of the
chronic ill patient, loss of income of the hospitalized
patient and/or caretaker and transportation costs) which
could independently aggravate the situation leading to
hardship financing. The recurring nature of outpatient
expenditures related to a chronic illness could cause
depletion of savings and attrition of goodwill of others to
give interest-free loans and thus increase the need for
hardship financing. In the case of hospitalizations one
should note that poor households usually have to pay
(some) costs upfront before admission to or treatment in
hospital [38]. Therefore the unpredictable timing of hos-
pital care and immediate need for large funds associated
with such an event could increase the risk of hardship
financing.
SHG membership surprisingly reported increased like-
lihood to have hardship financing, even though we have
seen that SHG members are slightly better off than non-
members (Additional File 1) and that better off house-
holds need less hardship financing. The explanation for
this phenomenon might be that members have their sav-
ings tied up in the scheme and can therefore not liquefy
those savings when needed. On the other hand, SHG
members have an easier access to low-interest loans
while non-members cannot easily access microfinance
and low-interest loans. Therefore it is possible that SHG
members would prefer this low-interest loan over bor-
rowing from relatives/friends who may not be able to
spare the money for a long time.
Finally it becomes very clear from the regression that
the difference in hardship financing across the three dis-
tricts could not be fully explained by the many household
features included in the model. We found that the district
where the household resides has a big significant inde-
pendent effect on the risk of hardship financing. Using
the step-wise regression method we found that when
healthcare costs are introduced into the model, the dif-
ference in the risk of hardship financing between Mal-
kangiri and Khorda became insignificant. The difference
in hardship financing between Kalahandi on the one
hand and Khorda and Malkangiri on the other hand
remained unexplained with the current set of variables:
living in Kalahandi could be associated with increased
likelihood of hardship financing, because of higher utili-
zation and costs of outpatient care compared to Malkan-
giri. In Khorda, both utilization and costs of outpatient
care were similar to those observed in Kalahandi, yet the
risk of hardship financing was significantly lower. This
could be linked to the related finding that average
income-proxy and asset-index in Khorda are higher than
in Kalahandi (the asset index introduced in the regression
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Page 10 of 13takes into account the wealth of the individual household
but the average asset index in the district reflects the
wealth of the social network). This difference could sug-
gest that households in Khorda have access to richer
family/friends (better social network) that can provide
more interest-free loans. This assumption gains credibil-
ity from the finding that a higher percentage of house-
holds in Khorda borrowed from relatives/friends,
compared to Kalahandi (table 4).
While this study can play an important role in advan-
cing the notion of hardship financing as a measure of
the effectiveness of health financing policy alternative to
the catastrophic spending method, there are some lim-
itations to this study. Without adequate data one cannot
conclude that the same findings would apply elsewhere.
And, as the source of data is interviews with respon-
dents, the regular limitations of self-reporting of inci-
dence of illness and cost of care apply.
5. Conclusions
Our study sheds light on a hitherto understudied dimen-
sion of hardship of very poor rural groups occasioned by
the need to raise funds to pay for healthcare out-of-pocket.
We defined “hardship financing” as borrowing with inter-
est or selling assets. The extra cost due to the interest pay-
able on money borrowed with interest is far from
negligible. We estimated the additional costs due to inter-
est on loans to pay for illness-related costs at 24% of the
health expenditure, a cost that represented nearly 5% of
households’ annual overall expenditure. The monetary
value of the loss due to selling assets is also not zero, but
hard to estimate. The hardship associated with these costs
extends well beyond the duration of the health event.
This analysis has shown that hardship financing occurs
not only in cases of expensive hospitalizations (40%) but
also in many cases of expenditures for outpatient (23%)
and maternity care (25%). Taking into account that the
frequency of outpatient utilization is much higher, many
more people actually face hardship financing due to out-
patient care than due to inpatient care.
We have shown that possession of assets and having
regular income-flow are predictors of lower expected
hardship financing, and better predictors than the income-
proxy of the household used in this study. The first para-
meter indicates the aggregate financial strength of the
household in an environment where many economical
transactions are not monetary. The second parameter is
self-explanatory, as regular income makes it easier to plan
future expenses based on stable future income. Interest-
ingly, not only the assets of the households with out-of-
pocket healthcare costs were negatively associated with
hardship financing, but also the average wealth in
the community in which the households resides. This indi-
cates that hardship financing is also influenced by
attributes of the social network the household can access;
better access to a wealthier social network seems to
increase the likelihood of obtaining interest-free loans.
Our study adds a qualitative dimension to understand-
ing health-related financial exposure among rural poor
households. Hardship financing is explained not only by
how much is spent out-of-pocket on healthcare in nom-
inal terms or relative to income or assets, but also by
when the payment occurs, and, as is the case with
chronic illness, its frequency and duration. This impor-
tant finding that rural poor households are subjected to
considerable and protracted financial hardship due to the
indirect and longer-term deleterious effects of how they
cope with out-of-pocket healthcare costs points to the
need to develop a policy solution that would limit that
exposure both in quantum and in time. We therefore
conclude that policy interventions aiming to ensure
health-related financial protection would have to demon-
strate that they have reduced the frequency and the
volume of hardship financing.
Endnotes
1) The 11 grassroots NGOs linked with Madhyam
Foundation, Bhubaneswar, Orissa included: (i) in Mal-
kangiri: Parivartan, PUSPAC, SOMKS, SDS, ODC; (ii) in
Kalahandi: Mahashakti Foundation, DAPTA, Lok
Yojana, Sanginee; and (iii) in Khorda MVPS, DSS.
2) SHGs represent a unique approach to financial
intermediation in communities. The approach combines
access to low-cost financial services with a process of
self-management and development for the SHG mem-
bers. SHGs are seen to confer many benefits, both eco-
nomic and social.
Additional material
Additional file 1: Demographics & socioeconomic status
disaggregated for members and non-members. This file contains the
same information of Table 1 on demographics and socioeconomic status
but separate for the member and non-member sub-cohorts (as defined
in the methods section).
Additional file 2: Morbidity, healthcare availability, utilization and
cost disaggregated for members and non-members. This file contains
the same information of Table 2 on morbidity, healthcare availability,
utilization and cost but separate for the member and non-member sub-
cohorts (as defined in the methods section).
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